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During the past year, Virginia's federal courts published surpris-
ingly few antitrust opinions. These few opinions indicate fact-spe-
cific analysis and little significant development to the law. How-
ever, the decisions reflect the continued difficulties faced by
private antitrust plaintiffs alleging conspiracy claims and criminal
antitrust defendants prosecuted for conduct which is illegal per se.
Antitrust plaintiffs, however, have enjoyed measured, if only tem-
porary, success. For example, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit reversed a grant of summary judgment
against a durable medical equipment company alleging monopoli-
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zation claims against a hospital and its affiliated medical equip-
ment company.' In another antitrust case, a district court accepted
the arguments of a steel fabricator alleging monopolization and
price discrimination by a major steel manufacturer, finding that
factual issues precluded a grant of summary judgment.2 While
these decisions prove beneficial to private antitrust plaintiffs, they
have been tempered by decisions of the United States Supreme
Court broadening application of the Noerr-Pennington antitrust
immunity doctrines and requiring inquiry in all instances into de-
fendants' market power in attempted monopolization cases.
II. FEDERAL CIVIL ACTIONS
A. Sherman Act Section 1 Conspiracy Issues
There were no published opinions this past year addressing
Sherman Act Section 1 conspiracy issues. The four unpublished
opinions which did address Section 1 were decided in the dealer
termination, tying arrangement and school milk price fixing
contexts.
Not surprisingly, the antitrust claims of terminated dealers fared
poorly. In Holabird Sports Discounters v. Tennis Tutor, Inc.,' the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that in light of Monsanto Co.
v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp.,' a terminated dealer failed to produce
sufficient evidence of a conspiracy between its competing dealers
and suppliers. Holabird was a dealer of tennis ball practice ma-
chines manufactured by Tennis Tutor, Inc. (TTI). TTI's dealers
were governed by its policy prohibiting advertising of the machine
"in any general circulation regional or national publication for less
than suggested retail price, including call for price advertise-
ments."'7 The advertising restriction did not prevent dealers from
selling the machine at whatever price they chose; it only prohibited
advertising the machine for sale at less than the suggested retail
1. M & M Medical Supplies & Services, Inc. v. Pleasant Valley Hospital, Inc., 981 F.2d
160 (4th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
2. Bristol Steel and Iron Works, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., No. 88-0296-A (W.D. Va.
Apr. 20, 1993) (memorandum opinion).
3. See infra note 101.
4. Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides: "Every contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
5. No. 92-2504, 1993 WL 147470 (4th Cir. May 7, 1993) (unpublished).
6. 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
7. 1993 WL 147470, at *1.
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price in regional and national publications.' The purpose of the re-
striction was "to maintain a healthy national distribution system
through the prevention of free-riding by national mail order dis-
count houses such as Holabird."9 TTI dealers who violated the pol-
icy were subject to termination.
TTI terminated Holabird's dealership when it learned Holabird
had violated the advertising restriction by placing an advertise-
ment in a national magazine which requested readers to call for
the price of TTI's machine. 10 After Holabird's termination, TTI
also took unilateral action to prevent its machines from being di-
verted to Holabird through other dealers.- In response, Holabird
sued TTI, alleging that its advertising restriction violated Section
1 of the Sherman Act. Citing the "thorough opinion" of the district
court,12 and noting that the application of Monsanto in Parkway
Gallery Furniture, Inc. v. Kittinger/Pennsylvania House Group,
Inc.'s was controlling, the Fourth Circuit court of appeals affirmed
the district court's grant of summary judgment for TTI because
Holabird "failed to produce sufficient evidence that TTI had en-
tered into a contract, conspiracy, or combination with any of its
dealers" and "failed to identify sufficient evidence tending to ex-
clude the possibility that TTI and its dealers acted independently
with regard to the advertising restriction....
8. Id.
9. Id. at *2. The Court explained the free-riding issue as follows:
Free-riding occurs when a discounter takes advantage of customer services offered by
local dealers. Since the Tennis Tutor is a complex, innovative machine, most prospec-
tive purchasers would not fully appreciate the benefits of the product unless dealers
make the effort to explain the machine, set up demonstrations, and allow trial use.
Without the advertising restriction, national mail order discounters that offer no such
special services could exploit the efforts of full-service local dealers: Customers would
go to their local dealer to gather information about the Tennis Tutor, but could then
order the machine for a lower price from a discounter that could afford to charge less
than the local dealer because it did not have to bear the expense of customer services.
According to TTI, this result would cause disgruntlement among local dealers, who
would respond by refusing to carry Tennis Tutors or by cutting back on their ser-
vices, either outcome of which would be detrimental.
Id. at *2, n.1.
10. Id. at *2.
11. Id.
12. Holabird Sports Discounter v. Tennis Tutor, Inc., No. 91-2208-WN (D. Md. Oct. 30,
1992).
13. 878 F.2d 801 (4th Cir. 1989).
14. 1993 WL 147470, at *2.
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The district court in W. A. Stratton Construction Co. v. Butler
Manufacturing Co.,15 also found insufficient evidence of conspir-
acy, dismissing a terminated dealer's Section 1 claims on summary
judgment. Stratton and Coleman-Adams were dealers of Butler's
manufactured building parts for prefabricated wood and steel
frame buildings. Stratton sued Butler and Coleman-Adams after
Stratton was terminated as a Butler dealer.16 The suit centered on
a meeting among Butler, Stratton, and Coleman-Adams where the
dealers' marketing territory was discussed and it was agreed that
Stratton would allow Coleman-Adams to service Lynchburg in ex-
change for Coleman-Adams surrendering Appomattox County to
Stratton.17 After the meeting, disagreements developed among the
parties, resulting in Stratton's termination as Butler's dealer.'8
Butler and Coleman-Adams moved for summary judgment on
Stratton's Section 1 claim. Stratton argued that the territory mar-
keting agreement constituted a horizontal restraint of trade, as it
was a conspiracy to allocate markets between competitors, which is
per se illegal under Section 1.19 The trial court disagreed, holding
the agreement to be nothing more than "a market division im-
posed by a supplier."20 Finding that Stratton failed to introduce
sufficient evidence of any horizontal restraint of trade, the court
granted summary judgment in favor of Butler and Coleman-
Adams.2
The Fourth Circuit was similarly unsympathetic to a plaintiff's
Section 1 tying claims in Montgomery County Ass'n of Realtors,
Inc. v. Realty Photo Master Corp.22 Realty Photo sought an inter-
locutory appeal from the district court's denial of a preliminary
injunction. Realty Photo sought to prevent Montgomery County
Association of Realtors (MCAR) from upgrading its computer ser-
vices database, thereby alleviating the need for some of Realty
Photo's services.23 MCAR used the computer database to dissemi-
nate real estate listing information to its member realtors. MCAR's
computer, however, could not transmit photographs of the prop-
15. No. 87-0041-C, 1992 WL 159107 (W.D. Va. June 23, 1992) (unpublished).
16. Id. at *1.
17. Id. at *3.
18. Id. at *5.
19. Id.
20. Id. at *7.
21. Id. at *9.
22. 1993-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,239 (4th Cir. May 20, 1993).
23. Id. at 70,179.
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erty, so Realty Photo, without MCAR's permission, accessed
MCAR's computer database and provided MCAR members with
real estate photographs.2" When MCAR decided to upgrade its
photo enhancement capabilities to handle that aspect of its ser-
vices, Realty Photo brought suit under the Sherman Act.25
Realty Photo contended that MCAR had illegally tied multiple
listing information to pictures of the real estate and sought an in-
junction.26 The district court disagreed, finding that the written
descriptions and pictures of the real estate are simply components
of only one product, the information about specific real estate
properties. The district court therefore rejected the tying claim,
finding that Realty Photo had failed to identify two separate prod-
ucts necessary to maintain a tying claim.28 Citing Service & Train-
ing, Inc. v. Data General Corp.,29 the court found that the focus of
the "separate products" inquiry turns not on the functional rela-
tion between the two allegedly separate products, but rather on the
character of the demand for the two items. The court concluded
that written and photographic real estate information traditionally
constituted a single product without separate consumer demand.30
In the final unpublished Section 1 case, United States v. Mary-
land and Milk Producers Cooperative Ass'n, Inc. Marva Maid
Dairy,31 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
addressed the level of proof necessary to show criminal intent
under Section 1 in the context of a per se violation such as price
fixing. In the court below, Marva Maid was convicted of rigging
bids on Tidewater school milk and argued on appeal that the gov-
ernment failed to prove that it had the necessary intent to violate
the Sherman Act. The fourth circuit was unimpressed, however,
noting that bid rigging itself is a per se violation of the Sherman
24. Id. at 70,180.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 70,181. Three factors must be shown to prove an illegal tying arrangement: (1)
two separate and distinct product markets must have been linked together; (2) the seller
must be using its market power to force its customers to accept the tying arrangement; and
(3) the tying arrangement must unreasonably restrain market competition in the tied prod-
uct. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9 (1984); see also Faulkner
Advertising Ass'n, Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp., 905 F.2d 769, 773 (4th Cir. 1990).
27. Realty Photo, 1993-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,239 at 70,181.
28. Id.
29. 963 F.2d 680, 684 (4th Cir. 1992).
30. 1993-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,239 at 70,181.
31. 1992-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,959 (4th Cir. Sept. 15, 1992), (unpublished) (cert. de-
nied, 113 S. Ct. 1580 (1993).
19931
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Act. Quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,-2 the
court held that the government did not have to prove that Marva
Maid's employee had a specific intent to restrain trade or violate
the Sherman Act.33 The government only needed to demonstrate
that the employee "acted with knowledge of the anticipated conse-
quences of his action. '3 4 If so, intent would be imputed to Marva
Maid vicariously.3 5 Under this standard, the court had little diffi-
culty finding that the government had presented sufficient evi-
dence of Marva Maid's intent.36
B. Sherman Act Section 2 Monopolization Issues
1. Attempted Monopolization and Monopolization
This past term, the Supreme Court-finally addressed the conflict
among between the circuits over the correct definition of the ele-
ments of the Sherman Act Section 237 offense of attempted monop-
olization. 8 The Court in Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan,3 9
considered whether proving an attempt to monopolize requires
proof of a dangerous probability of monopolization of a relevant
market. The Court took the opportunity to reprove the errant
Ninth Circuit court of appeals which in Lessig v. Tidewater Oil
Co., 40 in conflict with every other circuit,41 ruled that both the spe-
32. 438 U.S. 422, 446 (1978).
33. 1992-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 69,959, at 68,631 (citing United States v. Foley, 598 F.2d
1323 (4th Cir. 1979) and quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co. 438 U.S. 422,
446 (1978)); see also United States v. Smith Grading and Paving, Inc. 760 F.2d 527, 533 (4th
Cir. 1985) (holding the government does not need to show specific intent of defendant in per
se Sherman Act violation).
34. Id.
35. 1992-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,959, at 68,632.
36. Id. The Fourth Circuit also affirmed Marva Maid's convictions for mail fraud, finding
that Marva Maid had engaged in a scheme to defraud the schools of money or property and
used the mails in furtherance thereof. The court noted that the government need not prove
that the scheme to defraud was successful, but instead, only that Marva Maid intended to
design a bid rigging scheme for that purpose. Id.
37. Section 2 of the Sherman Act makes it unlawful to "monopolize, or attempt to mo-
nopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part
of the trade among the several States, or with foreign nations." 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
38. It is generally required that in order to demonstrate attempted monopolization, a
plaintiff must prove (1) that the defendant has engaged in predatory or anticompetitive
conduct with (2) a specific intent to monopolize, and, (3) a dangerous probability of achiev-
ing monopoly power. See 3 PHEinp AREEDA & DONALD TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 1 820 (1978);
see also Abcor Corp. v. AM Int'l, Inc., 916 F.2d 924, 926 (4th Cir. 1990); Advanced Health-
Care Serv., Inc. v. Radford Community Hosp., 910 F.2d 139, 147 (4th Cir. 1990).
39. 113 S. Ct. 884 (1993).
40. 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964).
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cific intent and dangerous probability elements may be inferred
from sufficient evidence of unfair or predatory conduct. Lessig re-
quired proof of the relevant market or defendant's market power 42
only when the evidence of unfair or predatory conduct is
insufficient.
The plaintiff in Spectrum Sports, a terminated regional distrib-
utor of sorbothane (a patented elastic polymer with shock absorb-
ing characteristics), sued the manufacturer and distributors of the
product, alleging violations of Sherman Act Section 2. Not surpris-
ingly after having been instructed on the Lessig standard,43 the
jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and the defendants
appealed.
The Supreme Court rejected Lessig's interpretation of Section 2,
holding that the "notion that proof of unfair or predatory conduct
alone is sufficient to make out the offense of attempted monopoli-
zation [was] contrary to the purpose and policy of the Sherman
Act."' 44 Reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Court went on to hold
that although "unfair" or "predatory" tactics may be sufficient to
prove the necessary intent to monopolize, a plaintiff must also
demonstrate a dangerous probability of monopolization through
"inquiry into the relevant product and geographic market and de-
fendant's economic power in that market. '45
The Court's decision in Spectrum Sports appears to place in
question the Fourth Circuit's en banc holding in M & M Medical
41. See Spectrum Sports, 113 S. Ct. at 889, citing Abbot Lab. v. Brennan, 952 F.2d 1346,
1354 (Fed. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2993; Key Enter. of Del., Inc. v. Venice Hosp.,
919 F.2d 1550, 1565 (11th Cir. 1990); Arthur S. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S. E. Johnson Co., 917
F.2d 1413, 1431-32 (6th Cir. 1990); Abcor Corp. v. AM Int'l, Inc., 916 F.2d 924, 926, 931 (4th
Cir. 1990); Twin Lab. Inc. v. Weider Health & Fitness, 900 F.2d 566, 570 (2nd Cir. 1990);
Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am., 885 F.2d 683, 693 (10th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 972 (1990); C.A.T. Indus. Disposal, Inc. v. Browning-Ferris
Indus., Inc., 884 F.2d 209, 210 (5th Cir. 1989); Indiana Grocery, Inc. v. Super Valu Stores,
Inc., 864 F.2d 1409, 1413-16 (7th Cir. 1989); General Indus. Corp. v. Hartz Mountain Corp.,
810 F.2d 795, 804 (8th Cir. 1987); Neumann v. Reinforced Earth Co., 786 F.2d 424, 428-29
(D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 851 (1986); CVD, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 769 F.2d 842,
851 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); Harold Friedman, Inc. v. Kroger Co.,
581 F.2d 1068, 1079 (3d Cir. 1978)).
42. 113 S. Ct. at 892.
43. The jury was instructed that "[i]f the Plaintiff has shown that the Defendant engaged
in predatory conduct, you may infer from that evidence the specific intent and the danger-
ous probability element of the offense without any proof of the relevant market or the De-
fendant's marketing [sic] power." Spectrum, 113 S. Ct. at 889 n.4.
44. Id. at 891.
45. Id. at 892.
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Supplies & Services Inc. v. Pleasant Valley Hospital, Inc.,4e which
was rendered a month and a half earlier. In M & M Medical Sup-
plies, a sharply divided court, reaching the same result as the
panel,4 vacated and remanded to the United States District Court
for the Southern District of West Virginia that court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of defendants, on plaintiff's attempted
monopolization and monopolization claims.
In M & M Medical Supplies, plaintiff M & M Medical Supplies
and Service, Inc., a durable medical equipment supplier (DME),
brought suit against Pleasant Valley Hospital and its subsidiary
DME company, alleging that the Hospital had used its control of
access to patients to exclude M & M from the market. The defend-
ants prevailed on their summary judgment motion. On appeal, M
& M challenged the district court's finding that M & M had failed
to adduce sufficient proof of the elements of monopolization and
attempted monopolization to withstand summary judgment. M &
M also challenged the district court's dismissal of M & M's monop-
oly leveraging claim on the ground that such a claim is not contem-
plated by the Sherman Act.48
First, the Fourth Circuit held en banc that the district court had
erred in dismissing M & M's monopoly claim on the grounds that
the affidavit of M & M's expert economist was inadequate." Re-
garding M & M's attempted monopolization claim on which the
district court had granted summary judgment for want of evidence
that Hospital patients were forced to purchase DME from the
Hospital's company, the court of appeals held that the district
court applied the wrong standard in assessing proof of specific in-
tent to monopolize.5 Citing Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands
Skiing Corp.,51 the court reasoned that specific intent to monopo-
lize can be inferred from predatory acts, which are established by
showing that a firm attempted to exclude competitors on a basis
other than efficiency.52 Finding sufficient evidence of exclusionary
conduct in the record to support an inference that the Hospital
was not motivated by efficiency or quality concerns such as the cir-
46. 981 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
47. The en banc opinion was decided 7-6. The three-judge panel, with one dissenter, also
vacated the district court's summary dismissal. See 946 F.2d 886 (4th Cir. 1991).
48. M & M Medical Supplies, 981 F.2d at 162.
49. Id. at 165. See discussion infra notes 153-59.
50. M & M Medical Supplies, 981 F.2d at 166.
51. 472 U.S. 585, 605 (1985).
52. M & M Medical Supplies, 981 F.2d at 167.
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culation by the Hospital of a memo suggesting that all doctors
practicing at the Hospital refer their patients to the Hospital's
DME company and the charging of less than competitive prices,
the court held that M & M was entitled at the summary judgment
stage to an inference of predatory conduct and of a specific intent
to monopolize.5 3
The court's analysis of the third element of M & M's attempted
monopolization claim, dangerous probability of success, may be in
conflict with Spectrum Sports. The court described a new, highly
flexible, approach to evaluating the sufficiency of plaintiffs' evi-
dence on the three elements of an attempt claim on summary judg-
ment. While acknowledging that market share is relevant in show-
ing a dangerous probability of success, the Fourth Circuit held that
its relevance is tempered by the strength of evidence of intent or
anticompetitive conduct.54 "Compelling evidence of an intent to
monopolize or of anticompetitive conduct reduces the level of mar-
ket share that need be shown."'
Significantly, the court adopted the following framework, bor-
rowed from Areeda & Turner,56 in evaluating market share in at-
tempt cases:
(1) claims of less than 30% market shares should presumptively be
rejected; (2) claims involving between 30% and 50% shares should
usually be rejected, except when conduct is very likely to achieve
monopoly or when conduct is invidious, but not so much so as to
make the defendant per se liable; and (3) claims involving greater
than 50% share should be treated as attempts at monopolization
when the other elements for attempted monopolization are also
satisfied.57
Surprisingly, immediately after setting out the above framework
of percentages of market shares and without discussing the market
share of the Hospital's DME company, the court concluded that:
"patients' descriptions of exclusionary anticompetitive conduct,
the affidavits of a doctor and of a former employee recounting
pressures applied by the Hospital, M & M's substantial decrease in
53. Id. at 167-68.
54. Id. at 168.
55. Id.
56. 3 PHLup AREEDA & DONALD TuRNER, ANTrTRUST LAW 835 (1978).
57. M & M Medical Supplies, 981 F.2d at 168.
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revenue, and Dr. Blair's affidavit adequately address the three ele-
ments of attempted monopolization. '58 The quoted portions of Dr.
Blair's affidavit, however, stated only that the Hospital's DME
company exercised monopoly power in the relevant market. The
affidavit did not address actual market share. 9 Moreover, the
Court's opinion did not address the economic power of the Hospi-
tal itself. Thus, it may be that the court's decision regarding the
Hospital conflicts with the Supreme Court's admonition in Spec-
trum Sports that in order for a plaintiff to survive summary judg-
ment on its attempt claim and meet the element of dangerous
probability of success, it must offer evidence of the defendant's ec-
onomic power in the relevant product and geographic markets.6
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court recently denied the hospital's pe-
tition for a writ of certiorari.61
Finally, in M & M Medical Supplies, the Fourth Circuit as it
had in its earlier unpublished panel decision, directed the district
court on remand to assume the viability of plaintiff's monopoly
leveraging claim as a distinct violation of Section 2, but expressed
no opinion. The court noted that "[t]here will be time enough to
evaluate the validity of this assumption after the parties have de-
veloped a factual record.""2
In two separate dissenting opinions, the six dissenters took issue
with the majority's treatment of: (1) the level of factual detail in
the expert economist's affidavit; (2) M & M's failure to establish
the relevant market for the sale of DME as opposed to the market
for hospital services; (3) M & M's evidence of the maintenance or
acquisition of monopoly power; and, (4) M & M's evidence of a
specific attempt to monopolize. 3 Noting that there had been no
evidence that the Hospital DME company had priced its equip-
ment below cost when it entered the DME market, Judge Luttig
(Judges Russell and Wilkinson concurring) lamented the majority's
holding: "The obvious effect of this novel holding, for which the
majority offers no support, is that an antitrust plaintiff can avoid
summary judgment on an attempted monopolization claim merely
58. Id.
59. Id. at 164.
60. 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1964).
61. No. 92-1685, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 4071 (June 14, 1993).
62. M & M Medical Supplies, 981 F.2d at 169.
63. Id. at 169-75.
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by proffering evidence that the defendant set its prices below those
of its competitors."64
In the only other Virginia Sherman Act Section 2 decision ren-
dered this past year, the United States District Court for the East-
ern Division of Virginia refused to grant summary judgment to a
steel manufacturer, finding issues of material fact. In Bristol Steel
and Iron Works, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 5 Bristol, a steel
fabricator,66 alleged that its steel supplier, Bethlehem, monopo-
lized or attempted to monopolize the market for the sale of certain
steel products. Bethlehem moved for summary judgment on Bris-
tol's Section 2 claim on the grounds that Bristol had no evidence
that Bethlehem exercised market power in an appropriately de-
fined market, and that Bethlehem's alleged pricing activity made
no economic sense and could not have facilitated the acquisition or
maintenance of monopoly power by Bethlehem.6
In the mid-1980s Bristol purchased a majority of its steel prod-
ucts, including rolled structural shapes and steel plate, from Beth-
lehem. Bristol alleged that Bethlehem monopolized or attempted
to monopolize the market for raw steel products in the geographic
region in which it competed by offering discriminatorily low price
quotes to Bristol's competing fabricators. This activity allowed
Bethlehem to effectively choose which fabricator would be the suc-
cessful low bidder on a specific project.68
Judge Richard L. Williams denied Bethlehem's motion for sum-
mary judgment, finding that factual issues existed for trial. In ana-
lyzing Bristol's attempt claim, the court referred to the sliding
scale set out in M & M Medical Supplies,69 and found there to be
a genuine issue of fact as to Bethlehem's market share because of
perceived conflicts in the evidence.70
Surprisingly, the court also rejected Bethlehem's argument that
Bristol's claim must fail because Bethlehem was not a competitor
in the fabrication market in which the alleged anticompetitive con-
64. Id. at 173.
65. No. 88-0296-A (W.D. Va. Apr. 20, 1993) (memorandum opinion).
66. The process by which raw steel products, such as rolled structural shapes and steel
plate, are prepared for erection in the construction of buildings and bridges through cutting
and welding is known as "fabrication." Id. at 2.
67. Id. at 6.
68. Id.
69. 981 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
70. Bristol Steel at 30.
1993] 585
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duct occurred. While conceding that Bethlehem and Bristol did
compete in distinct product markets, the court found that fact to
be "irrelevant" to Bristol's Section 2 claims.7 ' Distinguishing
White v. Rockingham Radiologists, Ltd.7 2 and Drs. Steur and
Latham, P.A. v. National Medical Enter., Inc.7 3 on the grounds
that those were Section 1 conspiracy cases, the Court held that
Section 2, which only addressed conduct by a single firm, did not
require a plaintiff purchaser to "compete" in the same market as
the alleged monopolist or attempted monopolist manufacturer. 4
2. Market Definition
In analyzing the market to determine if Bristol's Section 2
claims could survive summary judgment, the court agreed with the
narrow product and geographic market definitions advanced by
Bristol.7 5 For example, the court rejected Bethlehem's contention
that reinforced concrete directly competes with "plain material
steel sections, plates and shapes" for use in the construction of
bridges and buildings.7 The court reasoned that concrete only
competes in the market for fabricated steel, not unfabricated steel
which was the market Bristol alleged Bethlehem monopolized, be-
cause "concrete structural members are not functionally inter-
changeable and share no cross-elasticity of demand with plain, un-
fabricated steel shapes and plates. '7 7
With respect to the relevant geographic market, Bristol asserted
that it consisted of the mid-Atlantic region where it bid on
projects. Conversely, Bethlehem submitted evidence that the mar-
ket was international in scope because of international suppliers
Bristol could turn to for steel. While seemingly accepting that the
relevant geographic market is that "area in which the defendant
operates and the plaintiff can reasonably turn to for products or
services, ' 8 the court nevertheless rejected Bethlehem's pretrial ar-
gument, accepted the possibility that the relevant geographic mar-
ket may be that area where Bristol sold fabricated steel, and con-
71. Id. at 34.
72. 820 F.2d 98 (4th Cir. 1987).
73. 672 F. Supp. 1489 (D.S.C. 1987), aff'd, 846 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1988).
74. Bristol Steel at 34-35.
75. Id. at 34.
76. Id. at 25-26.
77. Id. at 26-27.
78. Id. at 27.
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cluded that an issue of fact existed.79 Perhaps recognizing its
difficult burden of proof on the issue, Bristol eventually dropped
its Section 2 claims prior to trial.
C. Price Discrimination
Bristol Steel and Iron Works, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.80
was also the only price discrimination case of the past year. The
district court rejected the parties' cross motions for summary judg-
ment, finding that there were triable issues of fact.81 Bristol alleged
that Bethlehem discriminated against it and in favor of other steel
fabricators by selling steel of like grade and quality to favored
Bristol competitors at a contemporaneous time, for discriminato-
rily low prices in violation of section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman
Act.82 In support of its claim, Bristol pointed to Bethlehem's inter-
nal price deviation reports (PDRs) which it said reflected com-
pleted sales.8 3 Bethlehem moved for summary judgment on the
grounds that Bristol had no evidence of two different contempora-
neous completed sales of like grade and quality, and that Bethle-
hem's price quotes were in response to "meeting competition. 8 4
The court first held that the issue of two actual contemporane-
ous sales presented genuine issues of fact not appropriate for sum-
mary judgment. In this regard, it noted that there was conflicting
evidence as to whether the PDRs, upon which Bristol relied, re-
flected actual sales or only price quotes.8 5 It also held that while
the issue of contemporaneousness is "primarily a question of
79. Id. at 27-29.
80. No. 80-0296-A (W.D. Va. Apr. 20, 1993) (memorandum opinion).
81. Id.
82. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1988). The relevant portion of Section 2(a) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different pur-
chasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or any of the purchas-
ers involved in such discrimination are in commerce,. . . and where the effect of such
discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monop-
oly in any line of commerce....
Id.
For a recent case applying section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act in a primary line con-
text, see Ligget Group, Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 964 F.2d 335 (4th Cir.
1992).
83. Bristol Steel, mem. op. at 5.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 10-12.
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fact,"8 sales occurring within a three month period were suffi-
ciently contemporaneous to survive summary judgment. 7
On the issue of "like grade and quality," Bethlehem argued that
Bristol was comparing apples and oranges because it was compar-
ing projects involving different grades, shapes, and sizes of steel.8
The court noted that "if meaningful functional and physical differ-
ences as perceived by the trade are demonstrated to exist," trans-
actions involving the goods are not comparable. 9 Applying this
test of "functional interchangeability," the court found Bethle-
hem's argument "compelling" but declined to grant summary judg-
ment because Bethlehem's own pricing scheme, providing the same
discount for all steel within a given grade, suggested that despite
the size of the steel, Bethlehem considered it of "like grade and
quality.
9 °
Bethlehem's argument that sales in the bidding context were not
"in competition" also failed. Bethlehem argued that as steel is only
purchased after a contract is awarded by only one fabricator for
any given project, competition ceases as soon as the bid is awarded.
Consequently, any subsequent sales are not made in competition.
While citing M. C. Mfg. Co. v. Texas Foundries, Inc. 1 for the pro-
position that it is irrelevant that a successful bidder was ultimately
able to obtain prices below those offered to its competitors when
bidding on a singular contract, the court found this case to be
more "akin to Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co.,92 where
competitors in the same market were simultaneously engaged in
competitive purchasing and selling," 93 and therefore inappropriate
for summary judgment. The court therefore denied both parties
summary judgment on Bristol's price discrimination claim.
86. Id. at 12.
87. Id. at 13.
88. The court explained:
By way of example, Bethlehem notes that one piece of A36 steel may be configured as
a four inch beam, suitable for spanning short spans and carrying light loads while a
second piece of A36 steel could be a massive thirty-six inch beam weighing hundreds
of pounds per foot and designed to support great weight.
Id. at 17-18.
89. Id. at 18.
90. Id.
91. 517 F.2d 1059, 1066 (5th Cir. 1975).
92. 87 F. Supp. 985, 987 (S.D. Fla. 1949), aff'd, 187 F.2d 919, 924 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 875 (1951).
93. Bristol Steel at 14.
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The case subsequently was tried solely on Bristol's pride discrim-
ination claim. During trial, Judge Williams denied Bethlehem's
motion for judgment as a matter of law. The case went to the jury
which found for Bethlehem on its "meeting competition" defense.
Following the verdict, Judge Williams denied Bristol's motion for a
new trial, and entered judgment for Bethlehem.
D. Antitrust Injury
The requirement of showing "antitrust injury,"94 that is, injury
to competition, rather than to individual competitors, which the
antitrust laws were designed to prevent, rather than to individual
competitors, is just one more hurdle for private antitrust plaintiffs.
The plaintiff in Bristol Steel and Iron Works, Inc. v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., however, met this requirement to avoid summary
judgment. The district court in Bristol Steel was not persuaded by
Bethlehem's argument that Bristol's alleged losses were wholly at-
tributable to a weakened demand for steel, finding there to be at
least a question of fact as to whether Bristol suffered antitrust in-
jury as a result of Bethlehem's allegedly discriminatory pricing
scheme."' While noting that Bristol may not assess damages based
solely on the fact that it did not also receive a discriminatory price,
the court found no fault with a damage calculation based only in
part on the discriminatory pricing.96 The court found that Bristol
had adequately presented such a calculation and that in any event,
in a secondary line price discrimination case such as this one,
under Federal Trade Commission v. Morton Salt Co.,97 a "compet-
itive injury" may be prima facie established by proof of a "sub-
stantial price discrimination between competing purchasers over
time."98
94. The threshold requirement that private antitrust plaintiffs must demonstrate "anti-
trust injury" is derived from Section 4 of the Clayton Act, which provides treble damages to
"[a]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbid-
den in the antitrust laws." 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988). The Supreme Court in Brunswick Corp. v.
Pueblo Bowl-A-Mat, 429 U.S. 477 (1977), pronounced, "[P]laintiffs must prove antitrust
injury, which is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws were designed to prevent and
that flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful." Id. at 489 (emphasis in
original).
95. Bristol Steel, mem. op. at 35-38. -
96. Id. at 36 (citing Hasbrouck v. Texaco, Inc., 842 F.2d 1034, 1043-44 (9th Cir. 1987),
aff'd, 496 U.S. 543 (1990)(court did not discuss or disagree with the lower court's approval
of a damage calculation based on plaintiff's receiving a lower price)).
97. 334 U.S. 37, 50 (1948).
98. Bristol Steel, mem. op. at 37.
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E. Antitrust Immunity Issues
In Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures
Industries, Inc.,9 the Supreme Court took the opportunity to elab-
orate on its holding in City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver-
tising, Inc.100 regarding proper application of the "sham" litigation
exception to the Noerr-Pennington antitrust immunity doctrine. 101
In so doing, the Court continued its trend in recent years of ex-
panding antitrust immunity.
In Professional Real Estate Investors, the operators of a resort
hotel installed videodisc players in the resort's hotel rooms and
rented videodiscs to guests for in-room viewing.10 2 The operators
also planned to sell videodisc players to other hotels which
designed to offer offering in-room viewing of videodiscs.10 3 Colum-
bia Pictures, one of eight major motion picture studios holding
copyrights to the motion pictures recorded on the videodiscs which
the operators purchased, also licensed the transmission of copy-
righted motion pictures to hotel rooms through a wired cable sys-
tem.10 4 Consequently, Columbia and the resort operators were
competitors in the market for in-room entertainment services in
hotels. Columbia sued the operators for alleged copyright infringe-
ment and the operators counterclaimed under the Sherman Act,
alleging that Columbia's copyright suit was "sham" litigation that
cloaked underlying acts of monopolization and conspiracy to re-
strain trade and was therefore not entitled to Noerr-Pennington
immunity.20 5
99. 113 S. Ct. 1920 (1993).
100. 111 S. Ct. 1344 (1991).
101. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine exempts from antitrust liability efforts to petition
the government. See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R.
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961). Under this doc-
trine, joint lobbying and other "efforts to influence public officials do not violate the anti-
trust laws even though intended to eliminate competition. Such conduct is not illegal, either
standing alone or as part of a broader scheme itself violative of the Sherman Act." Pen-
nington, 381 U.S. at 670. Noerr-Pennington immunity has been expanded beyond efforts to
influence legislation to include activity directed at courts and administrative agencies. In
City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., the Court distinguished situations in
which persons use the process of government as an anti-competitive weapon, from those
which use the outcome of the governmental process, ruling that whereas the "sham" excep-
tion encompasses the former, it does not apply to the latter. 111 S. Ct. at 1355.
102. Professional Real Estate Investor, 113 S. Ct. at 1923.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1924.
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The Court ruled "that an objectively reasonable effort to litigate
cannot constitute a sham, regardless of subjective intent."10 6 The
Court established a two-part test for determining whether litiga-
tion is a sham and thereby not entitled to immunity under the No-
err-Pennington doctrine:
(1) The lawsuit must be objectively baseless in that no reasonable
litigant could realistically expect success on the merits; and,
(2) If the litigation is objectively meritless, it must conceal an at-
tempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a com-
petitor through the use of the governmental process, as opposed to
the outcome of that process, as an anticompetitive weapon.",
The Court went on to hold that, even though Columbia's in-
fringement suit was dismissed, the action was "objectively plausi-
ble" due to the unsettled nature of the law regarding in-room view-
ing of copyrighted motion pictures. 08 Therefore, Columbia was
entitled to summary judgment on the operators' antitrust claims
because it was immunized under Noerr-Pennington.0 9
Of the three concurring justices, Justice Stevens and Justice
O'Connor most strongly attacked the majority's "unnecessarily
broad dicta." 1 0 Stevens indicated his uneasiness with the major-
ity's use of this "easy case" as a vehicle to unnecessarily announce
a more broad-reaching rule."' While agreeing with the majority
that the lawsuit was not "objectively baseless," and that an im-
proper subjective motive did not make a lawsuit a "sham," Justice
Stevens would avoid equating "objectively baseless" with the ques-
tion of whether any reasonable litigant could realistically expect
success on the merits."" 2 Justice Stevens noted that while there
may be lawsuits which fit in the latter definition, that same suit
may still be "objectively unreasonable," and therefore a sham,:"' a
possibility which the majority's broad dicta did not recognize.
106. Id. at 1926.
107. Id. at 1928.
108. Id. at 1930-31.
109. Id. at 1931.
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F. Statute of Limitations
A panel of the Fourth Circuit made clear its view of the proper
application of the Sherman Act's five-year criminal statute of limi-
tations in its unpublished opinion in United States v. Maryland
and Milk Producers Cooperative Ass'n, Inc., dibla Marva Maid
Dairy.114 In that case, Marva Maid argued that the government
failed to prove that the alleged Section 1 conspiracy continued into
the five year statute of limitations period. 15 Marva Maid's indict-
ment was returned on July 30, 1991.116 At trial, the government
offered evidence that the conspiracy started as early as 1984 and
continued through the 1986-1987 school year. While the evidence
was that the last conspiratorial meeting occurred in the spring of
1986, the government offered proof that Marva Maid accepted
money from rigged school milk bids as late as March 1987."1
Following the Supreme Court's lead in United States v. Kissel" 8
and Grunewald v. United States,"19 the court noted that the dura-
tion of a conspiracy is defined by the nature and scope of the con-
spiratorial agreement, which in this case included supplying milk
and receiving payments for the rigged price. 20 The court therefore
had no difficulty holding that each receipt of school milk payments
by Marva Maid constituted an overt act in furtherance of the con-
spiracy.' 2' As payments were made within five years of the indict-
ment, the action against Marva Maid was not time barred.
114. 1992-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 69,959 (4th Cir. Sept. 15, 1992).
115. The statute of limitations for noncapital federal criminal offenses, such as criminal
violations of the Sherman Act's prohibition against conspiracies in restraint of trade, is five
years. 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1988). The limitations period dates back from the time an indict-
ment is found or information is instituted. Id. In the case of criminal conspiracy the cause of
action accrues and the statute begins to run from the time of the last overt act which fur-
thers the conspiracy causing injury or damage is committed. Grunewald v. United States,
353 U.S. 391, 396-97 (1957); see also United States v. A-A-A Electrical Co., 788 F.2d 242,
245 (4th Cir. 1986) ("[t]he statute of limitations begins to run, not from the date of the
legally cognizable harm, but from the date of the last overt act.").
116. Marva Maid, 1992-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,959, at 68,630.
117. Id.
118. 218 U.S. 601 (1910).
119. 353 U.S. 391, 397 (1957).
120. Marva Maid 1992-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) T 69,959, at 68,631.
121. Id. at 68,631. In this regard, the Fourth Circuit stated: "Courts have uniformly held
that the limitations period extends until either final payments are received under the illegal
contracts or the illicit gains are finally distributed among co-conspirators." Id. at 68, 631 n.9
(citations omitted); see also United States v. Nazzaro, 889 F.2d 1158 (1st Cir. 1989); United
States v. Modern Elec. Co., 788 F.2d 232, 233 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v. Girard, 744
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G. Procedure, Evidence, Discovery and Remedies
1. Procedure
Putting an end to lengthy litigation, the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit refused to consider antitrust claims on remand
from the Supreme Court which were not raised and properly pre-
served in the initial appeal. The court also refused to allow the
plaintiffs to amend on appeal to add federal racketeering and state
law claims. The case, Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Columbia
Outdoor Advertising, Inc.,'22 which involved the City of Columbia
and two competing billboard advertising companies, had been ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court which found that there was no con-
spiracy exception to the Parker v. Brown'25 state action immunity
doctrine, and that the city was entitled to Noerr-Pennington im-
F.2d 1170, 1172-74 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Mennuti, 679 F.2d 1032, 1035-36 (2nd
Cir. 1982).
It may be, however, that unilateral activity by a conspirator in accepting payment on a
rigged bid is not enough to delay the start of the statute of limitations. In United States v.
Doherty, 867 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 918 (1989), the First Circuit was
faced with whether a police officer's receipt of salary payments in connection with a position
he fraudulently obtained forestalled the running of the statute of limitations. The court
held:
[W]here receiving the payoff merely consists of a lengthy, indefinite series of ordi-
nary, typically noncriminal, unilateral actions, such as receiving salary payments, and
there is no evidence that any concerted activity posing the special societal dangers of
conspiracy is still taking place, we do not see how one can reasonably say that the
conspiracy continues.
Id. at 61 (emphasis in original). The court went on to note that "in these latter circum-
stances, one would ordinarily view the receipt of payments merely as the "result" of the
conspiracy." Id.
The Doherty court distinguished the decisions of the other circuits by suggesting that
most of those cases involved more than unilateral activity, because the payoff required coop-
eration among conspirators. The court concluded by noting that:
We cannot read these cases as extending the conspiracy statute of limitations indefi-
nitely beyond the period when the unique threats to society posed by a conspiracy are
present. To do so "would for all practical purposes wipe out the statute of limitations
in [this kind of] conspiracy case[]."
Id. at 62 (quoting Gunnewald v. United States, 253 U.S. 391, 402 (1957)).
The Fourth Circuit addressed the Doherty holding squarely in United States v. Barsanti,
943 F.2d 428, 436 (4th Cir. 1991), holding that there was sufficient evidence of continued
concerted activity to bring the case within the rule announced in Doherty.
122. 974 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1992).
123. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). In Parker, the Supreme Court first enunciated the state action
doctrine holding that the Sherman Act was not intended to prohibit states from imposing
restraints on competition. "Although Parker involved an action against a state official, the
Court's reasoning extends to suits against private parties." Id. at 356.
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munity.1 2 4 The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Fourth
Circuit to consider whether Omni was entitled to a new trial on the
grounds that defendant advertising company, Columbia Outdoor
Advertising (COA), had engaged in several private, anticompetitive
actions. The Fourth Circuit held that plaintiff Omni had waived its
monopolization and attempted monopolization claims against COA
because they were not raised in the initial appeal.12 The court also
refused to allow Omni to amend its complaint under Rule 15(a) to
include RICO and state conspiracy and tortious interference
claims, noting that the latter cause of action simply was not availa-
ble to Omni, and that it would not permit amendments on the two
former causes of action because Omni was not entitled "to engage
in the litigation of cases one theory at a time. '126
In The Baltimore Luggage Co. v. Samsonite Corp.,27 the Fourth
Circuit affirmed the district court's decision that Baltimore's
claims for attorney's fees under the Lanham Act 128 were barred by
the doctrine of collateral estoppel and that its antitrust and unfair
competition claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata. 129
This procedurally complicated suit originated from Samsonite's
claim that Baltimore's introduction of a new luggage line impinged
upon Samsonite's trademark rights. While the case was pending in
the district court, Samsonite brought a parallel action before the
International Trade Commission (ITC) against Baltimore and
seven other respondents. 130 Baltimore raised twenty-one affirma-
tive defenses, but did not appeal the administrative law judge's ad-
verse findings on the unclean hands and bad faith defenses.' 3 '
After the ITC hearing, Samsonite moved for summary judgment
in the district court on Baltimore's antitrust and unfair competi-
tion claims, on the grounds that they were barred by res judicata
and collateral estoppel by the ITC ruling.3 2 The district court
granted Samsonite summary judgment and denied Baltimore at-
124. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1344 (1991). For a
discussion of this case, see Michael F. Urbanski, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Antitrust
and Trade Regulation Law, 25 U. RICH. L. REv. 560, 590-93 (1991).
125. 974 F.2d at 505.
126. Id. at 506.
127. Baltimore Luggage, 1992-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,998 (4th Cir. Oct. 16, 1992).
128. Under the Lanham Act, a prevailing party may recover attorney's fees in "excep-
tional cases." 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1988).





ANTITRUST AND TRADE REGULATION
torneys' fees under the Lanham Act on collateral estoppel
grounds. 13
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed
stating that the ITC's determinations were "entitled to res judicata
[claim preclusion] effect."1 34 Furthermore, the court found that as
Baltimore had been provided a "full and fair opportunity" to argue
its affirmative defenses in front of the ITC, there was no reason to
allow a relitigation by the district court.135 With regard to the
award of attorney's fees, the court ruled that the ITC's finding of
no bad faith by Samsonite was properly interpreted by the district
court to collaterally estop Baltimore from relitigating the issue.138
The Fourth Circuit also addressed whether a pre-indictment de-
lay had prejudiced a defendant, requiring reversal of a conviction
for bid rigging. This was one of the many defenses asserted by
Marva Maid on appeal in United States v. Maryland and Milk
Producers Cooperative Ass'n, Inc. dibla Marva Maid Dairy.3 7
The United States Department of Justice initiated its investigation
into the dairy industry in 1986, due to a suspicion that dairies were
rigging the bids for military milk contracts. 38 During the investi-
gation, Marva Maid's documents were subpoenaed by a federal
grand jury and Charles Elliott, a Marva Maid division manager,
was questioned extensively.'39 At that time, Elliott denied any bid
rigging on milk contracts, so in 1988, due to lack of evidence, the
government closed its investigation and returned the subpoenaed
documents. 40 In April 1990, after gaining more information on bid
rigging, the government reopened its investigation, focusing specif-
ically on school milk contracts.' 4 ' When the government again sub-
poenaed Marva Maid's documents, Marva Maid could not produce
twenty-five percent of them because it discarded them after the
133. Id.
134. Id. at 68,840.
135. Id.
136. The district court had ruled that the ITC's finding of no bad faith was not essential
to its judgment. Usually this serves to bar the claim from serving as grounds for collateral
estoppel. The Fourth Circuit, however, found an exception to this rule where the party nev-
ertheless received a "fair and full opportunity" to litigate. In such a case, collateral estoppel
would be allowed. Id. at 68,841 (citing Ritter v. Mount St. Mary's College, 814 F.2d 986,
993-94 (4th Cir. 1987)).
137. 1992-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,959 (4th Cir. Sept. 15, 1992) (unpublished).
138. Id. at 68,624.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 68,624-25.
141. Id. at 68,625.
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government closed its initial investigation. 142 Elliott was again ex-
tensively interviewed by the government. 43
On appeal from its subsequent conviction, Marva Maid argued
that its due process rights were violated. Marva Maid contended
that it was prejudiced by the government's delay in prosecuting
after the 1986 investigation, as it was not able to interview Elliott
and had innocently discarded some of the bid documents."' The
court analyzed Marva Maid's pre-indictment due process claim
under a two pronged inquiry. 4 ' It held that Marva Maid must
show: (1) actual prejudice was suffered, and (2) the delay, balanced
against the reasons for the delay, offends "fundamental concep-
tions of justice" or "the community's sense of fair play and de-
cency."' ' Applying this test, the court determined that the slight
prejudice to Marva Maid did not rise to a constitutional dimension
because Marva Maid had the opportunity to question Elliott at
trial and had other means available to piece together the bid work-
ups. 1' The court determined that the delay in prosecution was jus-
tifiably due to the government's lack of information to support
probable cause, rather than an attempt to gain a tactical advan-
tage, and therefore Marva Maid was not denied its due process
rights. 48
In an interesting opinion by the Circuit Court for the City of
Richmond, the court rejected the Virginia Attorney General's at-
tempt to disqualify an attorney who represented both a dairy com-
pany and its employee under investigation for violations of state
antitrust laws. 149 The dairy company, Meadow Gold Dairies, Inc.,
had previously plead guilty to federal antitrust violations in a simi-
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 68,626.
145. Id. (citing United States v. Automated Medical Lab. Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 403 (4th Cir.
1985)).
146. Id. (citing United States v. Automated Medical Lab. Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 403 (4th Cir.
1985) (quoting United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 (1977))).
147. Marva Maid, 1992-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 69,959 at 68,626.
148. Id. at 68,626-27. In this regard, the court noted that other circuits have also not
found due process violations without a showing of prejudice and evidence of the govern-
ment's intentional delay in order to gain a tactical advantage. See United States v. Sims,
779 F.2d 16, 17 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding a defendant must prove that the "government in-
tentionally delayed seeking an indictment to gain tactical advantage and that the delay sub-
stantially prejudiced his defense"); see also United States v. Benson, 846 F.2d 1338 (11th
Cir. 1988).
149. In re Civil Investigative Demand, No. 0057-92 (Rich. Cir. Ct. Oct. 15, 1992) (letter
opinion).
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lar criminal investigation. The Meadow Gold employee, James
Rhoads, had given testimony under subpoena to the federal grandjury. 50
The Attorney General argued that Rhoads' attorney, who had
represented both Rhoads and Meadow Gold in the federal investi-
gation, should be barred from representing Rhoads in the state
proceeding because of a conflict of interest.15 1 The court disagreed
and allowed the attorney to represent Rhoads, finding no present
conflict existed and that there had been full disclosure to both
Meadow Gold and Rhoads of the possibility of a conflict arising in
the future.1 52
2. Evidence
In M & M Medical Supplies and Service Inc. v. Pleasant Valley
Hospital, Inc.,155 the Fourth Circuit clarified the standard to be
applied to an expert's affidavit submitted in summary judgment
proceedings. 54 Plaintiff, M & M Medical Supplies, attempted to
avoid summary judgment on its monopolization claim through the
affidavit of an expert economist regarding the definition of the rel-
evant geographic market and defendant's exercise of monopoly
power. The district court refused to consider the expert's affidavit
and dismissed plaintiff's monopolization claim on summary judg-
ment, finding the affidavit conclusory and devoid of supporting
facts.15
Agreeing with its panel's earlier decision, the en banc Fourth
Circuit reversed the district court, holding that the affidavit satis-
fied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) which requires that affi-
davits submitted in summary judgment proceedings set forth spe-
150. Id. at 3.
151. The Attorney General argued that Rhoads' attorney had a conflict of interest be-
cause he could not advise Rhoads to cooperate with the Civil Investigation Demand investi-
gation without violating his duty to zealously represent Meadow Gold, a target of the CID
investigation, as it was in Meadow Gold's best interest to avoid Rhoads' disclosure of any
adverse information which could lead to civil remedies against it. Id. at 2. The attorney
argued, however, that the Attorney General had no evidence that Rhoads knew of any ad-
verse information.
152. Id. at 2-3.
153. 981 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
154. An affidavit that states facts on which the expert bases his opinion satisfies FED. R.
Civ. P. 56(e). Id. at 166.
155. An expert's affidavit that is wholly conclusory does not comply with FED. R. Civ. P.
56(e). Id. at 165 (citing Military Serv. Realty, Inc. v. Realty Consultants of Va., Ltd., 823
F.2d 829, 832 (4th Cir. 1987)).
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cific facts. Specifically, the majority noted that the affidavit set
forth sufficient facts and reasons for the conclusions drawn, and
the omission of the underlying data supporting those facts was not
fatal.158 In this vein, the court held that while Rule 56(e) trumped
Federal Rule of Evidence 705157 with regard to disclosure of facts
in a summary judgment proceeding, the two rules are reconcilable
because neither requires prior disclosure of the supporting data. 58
The court was careful to acknowledge, however, that while under-
lying data need not be submitted with a summary judgment affida-
vit, the trial court may always require such disclosure if it deems
necessary before ruling on the motion for summary judgment.15 9
In Montgomery County Ass'n of Realtors, Inc. v. Realty Photo
Master Corp.,160 plaintiff Realty Photo offered an expert affidavit
containing antitrust analysis in support of its motion for a prelimi-
nary injunction. 6' Because the affiant had no knowledge of the
real estate industry, the court declined to allow the affidavit as evi-
dence, essentially considering it an "interesting argument in sup-
port of [plaintiff's] legal positions.' 6 2 The court considered the an-
titrust analysis contained in the affidavit as argument akin to a
section of Realty Photo's brief; a decision clearly within the sound
discretion of the trial judge.6 3
In a milk bid rigging case won by the Antitrust Division of the
United States Department of Justice, United States v. Maryland
and Virginia Milk Producers Cooperative Ass'n,6 4 Marva Maid
also argued on appeal that the district court provided an erroneous
instruction on how the jury should treat Marva Maid's economic
evidence. 65 Marva Maid argued that the district court's use of the
word "disregarded" in the instruction charged the jury to totally
156. Id. at 165.
157. The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give reasons therefor
without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise.
The expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-
examination. FED. R. EVID. 705.
158. M & M Medical Supplies, 981 F.2d at 165.
159. Id. Interestingly, five of the six dissenters would have affirmed the trial court's grant
of summary judgment on the monopolization claim, taking issue with the majority's treat-
ment of, among other things, the level of factual detail in the expert economist's affidavit.
Id. at 169-70.
160. 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) (1993-1 Trade Cas.) 70,239 (4th Cir. May 20, 1993).
161. Id. at 70,181-82.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. 1992-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) % 69,959 (4th Cir. 1992).
165. Id. at 68,633-34. The district court instructed the jury as follows:
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disregard its economic evidence. 166 While the district court admit-
ted all of Marva Maid's economic evidence, it limited the scope of
the evidence with a cautionary instruction designed to indicate
that although the reasonableness of prices and profits may negate
the existence of a price-fixing conspiracy, if the jury found that
price-fixing existed, then the fact that the fixed prices were reason-
able is no defense.1 6 7 The Fourth Circuit held that the instruction
did not "undermine the fundamental fairness of the trial and [re-
sult in] a miscarriage of justice," and therefore found no error."'
Marva Maid also contended on appeal that the convictions
should be overturned because the government failed to satisfy its
Brady and Jencks Act obligations, in that the government failed to
turn over the exculpatory notes in which Elliott stated that there
had been no collusion on school bids.169 Under Brady v. Mary-
land,17 0 the government has the obligation to disclose evidence
which is favorable to the accused, upon the request of the accused,
which if suppressed, would deprive the defendant of a fair trial.'17
You may consider the evidence relating to the cooperative's cost, prices, profits, along
with all the other evidence you have seen or heard in the trial, in determining
whether or not a conspiracy existed. And if so, whether or not the cooperative was a
knowing, willful member of that conspiracy.
Id. at 68,633.
The court then stated:
[Y]ou may consider the evidence of the price, cost and profits only as it relates to
whether or not there was indeed an agreed conspiracy to submit rigged bids and
whether the Defendant cooperative was a member thereof. '
If you should ultimately determine from all the evidence in the case, including the
profit income evidence, that it has been proved beyond reasonable doubt that such
conspiracy did in fact exist and that this Defendant was a member thereof and par-
ticipated therein, then the economic evidence of price, cost and profits is to be disre-
garded by you. It is no defense to illegal bid rigging when found that the prices, cost
or profits were reasonable, unreasonable, high, low, fair, or unfair.
Id.
166. Id. at 68,634.
167. Id. (citing United States v. Portsmouth Paving Corp., 694 F.2d 312, 317 (4th Cir.
1982)).
168. Id. (quoting Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448, 450 (1926); United States v.
Polowichak, 783 F.2d 410, 416 (4th Cir. 1986)).
169. Id. at 68,627.
170. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) ("[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable
to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to
guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.").
171. 1992-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 68,627 (quoting United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011,
1014 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 230 (1991) ("Suppression of exculpatory evidence by
the government that is material to the outcome of the trial violates due process.")); United
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985) (Evidence is material when "there is a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding
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The court determined that the government had complied with the
Brady requirement by providing all of the exculpatory and im-
peachment evidence which it possessed. The production of the ac-
tual notes would have merely been duplicative and cumulative of
information already provided and would not have resulted in a dif-
ferent outcome.172
Marva Maid also argued that the Government violated the
Jencks Act' by failing to produce Elliott's interview notes after
he had testified at trial.174 However, the court held that defendants
had failed, on cross-examination, to establish the evidentiary foun-
dation for an in camera inspection of the notes, and further that
the notes were not Jencks Act "statement .M7 5
Finally, the testimony of a statistical expert was disallowed by
Judge Jackson L. Kiser United States District Court for the West-
ern District of Virginia in United States v. Woods,17 6 a criminal
price fixing case, because the government's expert witness was
identified too close to the time of trial.17 7
would have been different."); United States v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378, 380 (4th Cir. 1990) ("A
'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.")
(citations omitted); Giglio v. United Sates, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (holding that Brady
requires the disclosure of material impeachment evidence when the reliability of a witness
may be determinative of guilt or innocence.)
172. 1992-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 69,959, at 68,628. The Fourth Circuit engaged in its own
in camera review of the notes in reaching its conclusion.
173. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1988). The Jencks Act requires the Government to produce "any
statement (as hereinafter defined) of the witness in the possession of the United States
which relates to the subject matter as to which the witness has testified" once that govern-
ment witness has testified on direct examination. Id. § 3500(b). "Statement" is defined as:
(1) a written statement made by the witness and signed or otherwise adopted or approved
by him; (2) a substantially verbatim transcription and contemporaneous recording of the
oral statement of the witness; or (3) a statement made by the witness to a grand jury. Id.
§ 3500(e). An in camera inspection may be had of interview notes by the court upon a
showing by the moving defendant that there is probative evidence that such statements
exist. Id. § 3500(c).
174. 1992-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 68,628.
175. Id. at 68,629-30 (citing United States v. Hinton, 719 F.2d 711, 715 (4th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1032 (1984) (finding that government notes of a statement by a wit-
ness are not a Jencks Act "statement" "unless it reflects the witness' own words fully and
without distortion," and is coupled with "a 'finding of unambiguous and specific approval'
of specific notes.").
176. Crim. No. 90-92-R (W.D. Va. June 24, 1992).
177. Id. The government abandoned its prosecution of individuals allegedly involved in
this milk bid rigging case after a lengthy trial which resulted in a hung jury. The evidentiary
ruling was made by Judge Kiser orally from the bench.
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3. Discovery
In Miranda v. Norton Community Hospital, Inc.,117 Miranda, a
general surgeon, and his professional corporation sued Norton
Community Hospital alleging Sherman Act Section 1 violations
and various state claims. Miranda claimed that the Hospital was
conspiring with its medical staff to withhold referrals from him.1
In response to Miranda's interrogatories relating to any "proceed-
ings, minutes, records, and reports of any medical staff," ' The
Hospital claimed that this information was privileged by statute.
The court disagreed, invoking the good cause exception to the stat-
utory peer review privilege.""1 The court also found that discovery
should be limited to the critical issue of whether the Hospital con-
trolled the peer review process invoking the reasoning of Oksanen
v. Page Memorial Hospital.'s2 Thus, only if the discovery revealed
no alternative, legitimate basis for Hospital's actions or if it re-
vealed any indication of an independent conspiracy among the
medical staff, could Miranda petition for further discovery.1 83
4. Remedies
In United States v. Maryland and Milk Producers Cooperative
Ass'n, 4 Marva Maid was convicted of a Sherman Act violation
and fined one million dollars and was convicted on two counts of
mail fraud and fined $50,000 on each count.8 5 The district court,
working under the guidelines established under the Criminal Fines
Enforcement Act," 6 considered the following factors in imposing
the sentence: (1) the nature of the activities; (2) any burden a fine
would inflict on Marva Maid; (3) the pecuniary loss inflicted on
school districts; and, (4) the need to deprive Marva Maid of ille-
178. No. 91-0086-B (W.D. Va. Mar. 3, 1993).
179. Id. at 1.
180. Id. at 4.
181. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.17 (Repl. Vol. 1992) recognizes an exception to the peer
review privilege "for good cause arising from extraordinary circumstances." Judge Williams
found that as Norton had not yet secured a dismissal of Miranda's claims, the situation fell
within this statutory exception. Miranda, No. 91-0086-B at 4.
182. 945 F.2d 696 (4th Cir. 1991). In Oksanen, the Fourth Circuit held that a hospital
which maintains ultimate control over its peer review process cannot conspire with its medi-
cal staff during that process because the medical staff is acting as its agent. Id. at 705-06.
183. Miranda, No. 91-0086-B at 7.
184. 1992-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 69,959, at 68,633, cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1580 (1993).
185. Id. at 68,634.
186. 18 U.S.C. § 3622 (1988).
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gally gotten gains gotten from the bid rigging. 8 7 Marva Maid ar-
gued that the profits it derived from bid rigging were minimal,
thereby making the district court's assessment of a large fine
clearly erroneous.""' The court easily disposed of this argument
noting that the record established that the court did not abuse its
discretion in assessing the fines at $1.1 million.' 9 Marva Maid ar-
gued that the district court had improperly included Norfolk
schools in its assessment of fines when Norfolk had not been
named in the indictment. 90 The Fourth Circuit disagreed, noting
that while Norfolk was not specifically mentioned in the indict-
ment, its inclusion did not broaden the charges in the indict-
ment.' 9 ' Thus, the government could introduce evidence of overt
acts which were not specifically enumerated in the indictment.9 e2
Further, the Fourth Circuit held that regardless of whether evi-
dence regarding.Norfolk was admitted, the sentencing court can
and should consider the total amount of pecuniary loss to the vic-
tims of a crime in imposing an appropriate sentence.'9 3
III. FEDERAL REGULATORY, ADMINISTRATIVE AND ENFORCEMENT
EFFORTS
A. Criminal Enforcement Efforts
Apparently, the United States Justice Department has finally
begun to conclude its investigation of the dairy industry, but with
mixed results. In United States v. Land-O-Sun Dairies, Inc.,9'9
Land-O-Sun Dairies pled guilty to Sherman Act Section 1 viola-
tions for four separate conspiracies to rig bids on contracts to sup-
ply dairy products to public schools in North Carolina, South Car-
olina, and Georgia. Land-O-Sun agreed to pay $3.5 million in fines,
including $750,000 in Virginia.
The Justice Department also obtained guilty pleas and fines
from two southwestern Virginia dairy companies. Those compa-





192. Id. (citing United States v. American Waste Fibers Co., 809 F.2d 1044, 1046-47 (4th
Cir. 1987)).
193. Id. (citing United States v. Rothberg, 954 F.2d 217, 219 (4th Cir. 1991) (regarding
sentencing guidelines)).
194. No. 92-162-N (E.D. Va. Sept. 15, 1992).
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nies, Meadow Gold Dairies, Inc., owned by Borden, Inc., and Val-
ley Rich Dairy, a Roanoke joint venture, pled guilty to single count
informations alleging conspiracy in violation of Sherman Act Sec-
tion 1 to fix prices and rig bids on dairy products contracts for
school systems in Virginia and West Virginia. Meadow Gold agreed
to pay a one million dollar fine and Valley Rich paid $500,000.195
The Antitrust Division's Cleveland Field Office, however, failed
to obtain convictions against the individuals alleged to have partic-
ipated in the alleged school milk bid rigging. While no Valley Rich
employees were changed, three Meadow Gold employees were in-
dicted in June, 1992.196 After a two week trial resulting in a hung
jury, the government dropped all charges.
B. FTC Enforcement Activity
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) reported two enforce-
ment actions during the past year. In the first, the FTC filed a
complaint alleging that Business Computer Systems (BCS) a.k.a.
Megasource, a mail order computer company, and its founders, vi-
olated the FTC's Mail Order Rule197 in numerous instances.198 The
complaint charged the defendants with missing shipping deadlines
for customers' orders and failing to deliver orders.199 BCS and its
founders were also charged with failing to issue promised credits or
refunds to its customers. 00 At the request of the FTC, the district
court granted a temporary restraining order which barred BCS
from engaging in any of the alleged illegal activities, pending deci-
sion on the FTC's request for a permanent injunction and payment
of consumer redress.201
In the other enforcement action, the Circuit Court of Campbell
County granted the FTC an investigative order to force American
Dollar Exchange Inc., trading as AMDEX, a coin dealer, and its
195. See United States v. Meadow Gold Dairies, Inc., Crim. No. 92094 (W.D. Va. July 7,
1992); United States v. Valley Rich Dairy, Crim. No. 92-91 (W.D. Va. July 24, 1992).
196. 92-90-R (W.D. Va. June 24, 1992).
197. 16 C.F.R. § 435 (1975).
198. 1992-3 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 23,344 (E.D. Va. Mar. 3, 1993). The Federal Trade Com-
mission alleged BCS violated the Mail Order Rule by failing to: have any reasonable basis to
expect that it could ship customers' orders within the time frames it gave to customers; give
customers the option of a refund or consent to a delay when the orders could not be deliv-
ered within the promised time; and, refund promptly. Id. at 23,021-22.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 23,021.
201. Id.
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president to disclose certain information which would enable the
court to determine if AMDEX had violated the Consumer Protec-
tion Act. 2  AMDEX moved to protect for some of the requested
information20 3 under the theory that the government lacked rea-
sonable cause to investigate.0 4 The court disagreed, finding that
reasonable cause existed from the very promotional material,
AMDEX created.20 5 The court therefore denied AMDEX's motion
to protect its customer list, but stayed the investigative order re-
garding AMDEX's purchasing information because that informa-
tion was unnecessary to the investigation.2 06
IV. CIVIL ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
OF VIRGINIA
The Antitrust and Consumer Litigation Section of the Attorney
General's Office has been busy this past year. It settled a pending
lawsuit concerning the sale and distribution of the drug Clozaril
and began prosecuting a new civil antitrust suit against two more
dairies for alleged bid rigging.
The settlement of the Clozaril suit, first reported in the 1991 An-
titrust Law Survey,207 received final approval on November 20,
1992.28 The suit charged Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corporation and
Caremark, Inc. with violating both federal and state antitrust laws
through their allegedly restrictive method of distributing the
breakthrough schizophrenia drug Clozaril. The settlement forbids
Sandoz and Caremark from continuing to distribute Clozaril
through the Clozaril Patient Management System and calls for the
payment of approximately ten million dollars to consumers, with
202. 1992-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,895 (Campbell County Cir. Ct. May 15, 1992); see the
Consumer Protection Act, VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-196 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
203. Section 59.1-210 of the Consumer Protection Act allows the target of an investigative
order twenty-one days after service of the order to seek a protective order or other form of.
relief. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-210 (Repl. Vol. 1992). Pursuant to this section AMDEX moved
to protect documents detailing its Virginia customers and silver coin purchases. 1992-1
Trade Cas. (CCH) at 68,256.
204. See VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-201(A), (B)(2) (Repl. Vol. 1992). Reasonable cause to be-
lieve there may have been or there may be a violation of the Act must exist before an
investigative order will be granted.
205. 1992-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,895 at 68,257.
206. Id.
207. See Michael F. Urbanski, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Antitrust and Trade Reg-
ulation Law 25 U. RICH. L. REV. 565, 600 (1991).
208. Commonwealth v. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp., No. 91C3078, MDL 874 (N.D. Ill.
Dec. 18, 1990).
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$100,000 to go to consumers. The mental health departments of
the thirty-three litigating states will receive three million dollars in
credits toward future purchases of Clozaril, with $100,000 going to
Virginia's Department of Mental Health, Mental Retardation and
Substance Abuse Services, and the states were awarded $2.08 mil-
lion in attorneys' fees. Virginia's share of the attorneys' fees award
was $195,000.
The new antitrust suit against the southwestern Virginia dairies,
Meadow Gold Dairies, Inc., and Valley Rich Dairy, culminates a
lengthy investigation by the Attorney General and comes in the
wake of guilty pleas by the companies to violations of federal anti-
trust laws.209 The suit alleges violations of federal and state anti-
trust laws on behalf of ten school systems in southwest Virginia.21 0
It seeks damages from the companies for allegedly conspiring to rig
the milk bids for the schools from 1984 through 1988 by discussing
which of the dairies should be the low bidder on particular con-
tracts, allocating contracts among themselves, intentionally sub-
mitting complimentary bids, and disclosing to each other prospec-
tive bid amounts.2 11 The suit also alleges that the dairies fixed the
prices of milk sold to non-governmental wholesale customers in
southwest Virginia from 1984 through 1986 and seeks civil penal-
ties of $100,000 against both dairies under the Virginia Antitrust
Act for this alleged conduct.212 The companies' motions to dismiss
the case for failing to sufficiently plead fraudulent concealment to
avoid the bar of the statutes of limitations, as well as the Attorney
General's lack of standing to bring a federal action on behalf of the
local school boards, were denied.2 3 The statute of limitations issue
likely will be addressed on summary judgment.
209. Commonwealth v. Meadow Gold Dairies, Inc., Civil Action No. 93-0276-R (W.D. Va.
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V. FEDERAL AND STATE LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY
A. Federal Legislation
1. Communications Act of 1934
The Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act
of 1992214 ("Act") was passed this year to amend Title II of the
Communications Act of 1934.215 Consumers have been subjected to
increasing prices for cable service resulting from the concentrated
nature of the deregulated cable industry. The Act is designed to
increase consumer protection while promoting competition in the
cable television area.
The Telephone Disclosure and Dispute Resolution Act21e was
also passed this year 217 to amend certain sections of the Communi-
cations Act of 1934.218 The Act seeks to effectuate a national sys-
tem to regulate interstate pay-per-call services as well as to moni-
tor advertising practices in the hope of providing increased
consumer protection in this area.
2. Health Care Reform
With all the attention that health care reform has received re-
cently, no less than four bills have been proposed to ease the appli-
cation of the antitrust laws on hospitals and other health care fa-
cilities. One such bill, House Bill 73219 would require the Secretary
of Health and Human Services and the Attorney General to jointly
carry out a demonstration program for hospitals to promote the
sharing of medical equipment and facilities in the hope of cutting
duplicative health care costs.220 This would be accomplished
through exemptions from certain antitrust laws for eligible medical
facilities.
214. 106 Stat. 1460 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
215. 47 U.S.C. § 531 (1988).
216. 15 U.S.C. § 5701 (1988).
217. Pub. L. 102-556, 106 Stat. 4181 (1992) (codified at 15 UCS §§ 5701-24).
218. 47 U.S.C. §§ 227, 228, 302 (1988).
219. H.R. 73, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (entitled the Health Services Cost Control Act).
220. Id. § 3 (amending Part D of Title VI of the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 291k et seq.).
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House Bill 286221 is similar in substance to House Bill 73. It pro-
poses amending the Public Health Service Act 22 2 to encourage co-
operative agreements among hospitals and other health care prov-
iders.223 Under this bill, these cooperative agreements would not be
considered a violation of the antitrust laws.224 A similar bill focus-
ing on encouraging cooperative arrangements among hospitals in
low population areas would also exempt eligible hospitals from cer-
tain antitrust laws.225
Finally, House Bill 47226 would provide an antitrust exemption
for any medical self-regulatory entity which engages in standard
setting and enforcement activities designed to promote higher
quality health care.227 Thus, medical associations, medical staff, or
recognized accrediting agencies, which engage in standard setting
activities such as peer review procedures, technology assessment,
and risk management would be exempt from antitrust laws. 228 The
Clinton administrations proposed heath care reform is expected to
incorporate similar antitrust exemptions to facilitate the elimina-
tion of duplicative health care costs.
3. McCarran-Ferguson Act
A proposed amendment to the McCarran-Ferguson Act 229 is now
pending in Congress and has been referred to the House Commit-
tee on the Judiciary. 230 This amendment would, in large measure,
remove the antitrust exemption available to the insurance industry
by making it illegal for anyone in the insurance business to engage
in price fixing, allocation of geographical market areas, tying of in-
surance policies, or monopolization or attempting monopolization
of any part of the insurance business.2 31 An expected ruling by the
221. H.R. 286, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (entitled the Hospital Cooperative Agreement
Act).
222. 42 U.S.C. § 201.
223. See 42 U.S.C. § 291k. (Part D of Title VI).
224. H.R. 286 § 647(G)(1).
225. H.R. 1876, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (entitled the Hospital Antitrust Fairness
Act).
226. H.R. 47, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
227. Id. § 2.
228. Id. § 3(1), (2).
229. 15 U.S.C. § 1011.
230. H.R. 9, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
231. Id.
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Supreme Court concerning McCanan-Ferguson immunity may
moot, at least in part, the need for this bill.2"2
B. State Legislation
There was no significant antitrust legislation passed by the Vir-
ginia General Assembly this past year.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Fourth Circuit released a very sparse collection of published
antitrust decisions during the past year, and the court of appeal's
sharply divided en banc decision in M & M Medical may be called
into question by the United States Supreme Court's subsequent
opinion in Spectrum Sports. The Supreme Court did, however,
hand down two substantive opinions, one in the area of monopoli-
zation under Section 2 of the Sherman Act and the second discuss-
ing the application of the Noerr-Pennington antitrust immunity
doctrine. The Supreme Court brought the Ninth Circuit in line
with the majority of circuits by overruling the Lessig opinion in its
decision in Spectrum Sports, and, in Professional Real Estate In-
vestors, the Court continued its trend to expand application of the
Noerr-Pennington antitrust immunity doctrine. In short, while the
Supreme Court's opinions contributed to development of the law,
Virginia's federal courts brought few significant changes to anti-
trust jurisprudence in the Fourth Circuit during this past year.
232. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California and Merrett Underwriting Agency Management,
Ltd. v. California, 938 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1991), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 113 S. Ct. 52
(1992).
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